She and The Ship

Vojislav Bozickovic

SHE AND THE SHIP

Abstract: Consider a case in which the subject observes the bow and the stern of the same ship in the Timok river to the left and the right of a the Zajecar brewery building that blocks the central view such that she mistakes them for parts of two different ships. She notices that “the ship to the left” is F while “the ship to the right” is G but as a result of her ignorance refrains from the following inference:

1. This ship (pointing to the ship’s bow) is F
   This ship (pointing to the ship’s stern) is G
   Something is both F and G

Both premises are true and so is the conclusion but, due to her ignorance of the sameness of reference, the subject fails to accept that the conclusion is true

Consider also a reverse case in which the subject instead observes parts of two different ships in the qualitatively same circumstances She notices that “it” has features F and G and makes the following inference:

1. This ship (pointing to the bow of the first ship) is F
   This ship (pointing to the stern of the second ship) is G
   Something is both F and G

The premises are about two different ships and true, the conclusion is false, but the subject fails to accept that it is false.

According to the referentialist view, both premises of (I) contain the same content-constituent which, in entailing the true conclusion, make inference (I) valid. If so, the subject fails to notice that a valid inference is valid. On the other hand, inference (II) is invalid but the subject fails to notice this.

Now consider the widespread requirement that an adequate account of reasoning that features in inferences must be clear about the distinction between errors of fact and errors of reasoning. For, in blurring this distinction the subject who looks fully rational is made to look as if she is committing a simple logical fallacy in her reasoning (Boghossian 2011, 457-458; Stalnaker 2008, 114-115). In view of this, on the referentialist view, the subject has blurred the distinction between errors of fact and errors of reasoning in failing to realize that inference (I) that is valid is a valid inference. Similarly, given the error of fact that the subject is making in being disposed to reason in accordance with inference (II), she fails to recognize an invalid inference as invalid, which way the distinction between errors of fact and errors of reasoning is once again blurred.

Please be patient and wait for the September 2023 Felix Romuliana gathering to hear the rest of the story together with an attempted way out and pehaps a satisfactory solution.